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OPINION
Why science needs philosophy
Lucie Laplanea,b,1, Paolo Mantovanic,1, Ralph Adolphsd, Hasok Change, Alberto Mantovanif,g,
Margaret McFall-Ngaih, Carlo Rovellii, Elliott Soberj, and Thomas Pradeua,k,2
A knowledge of the historic and philosophical
background gives that kind of independence
from prejudices of his generation from which
most scientists are suffering. This independence
created by philosophical insight is—in my opinion—
the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or
specialist and a real seeker after truth.
Albert Einstein, Letter to Robert Thornton, 1944
Despite the tight historical links between science
and philosophy, present-day scientists often perceive
philosophy as completely different from, and even
antagonistic to, science. We argue here that, to the
contrary, philosophy can have an important and pro-
ductive impact on science.
We illustrate our point with three examples taken
from various fields of the contemporary life sciences.
Each bears on cutting-edge scientific research, and
each has been explicitly acknowledged by practic-
ing researchers as a useful contribution to science.
These and other examples show that philosophy’s
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contribution can take at least four forms: the clarifica-
tion of scientific concepts, the critical assessment of
scientific assumptions or methods, the formulation of
new concepts and theories, and the fostering of di-
alogue between different sciences, as well as between
science and society.
Conceptual Clarification and Stem Cells. First,
philosophy offers conceptual clarification. Conceptual
clarifications not only improve the precision and utility
of scientific terms but also lead to novel experimental
investigations because the choice of a given concep-
tual framework strongly constrains how experiments
are conceived.
The definition of stem cells is a prime example.
Philosophy has a long tradition of investigating prop-
erties, and the tools in use in this tradition have recently
been applied to describe “stemness,” the property that
defines stem cells. One of us has shown that four dif-
ferent kinds of properties exist under the guise of
stemness in current scientific knowledge (1). Depend-
ing on the type of tissue, stemness can be a categorical
property (an intrinsic property of the stem cell, in-
dependent of its environment), a dispositional property
(an intrinsic property of the stem cell that is controlled
by the microenvironment), a relational property (an
extrinsic property that can be conferred to non–stem
cells by the microenvironment), or a systemic property
(a property that is maintained and controlled at the
level of the entire cell population).
Stem cell and cancer biology researcher Hans
Clevers notes that this philosophical analysis high-
lights important semantic and conceptual problems in
oncology and stem cell biology; he also suggests this
analysis is readily applicable to experimentation (2).
Indeed, beyond conceptual clarification, this philo-
sophical work has real-world applications as illustrated
by the case of cancer stem cells in oncology.
Research aimed at developing drugs targeting ei-
ther the cancer stem cells or their microenvironment
actually rely on different kinds of stemness and are
thus likely to have different rates of success depend-
ing on cancer type (1). Moreover, they might not cover
all cancer types because current therapeutic strategies
do not take into account the systemic definition of
stemness. Determining the kind of stemness found in
each tissue and cancer is thus useful to direct the
development and choice of anticancer therapies. In
practice, this framework has led to the investigation of
cancer therapies that combine the targeting of intrinsic
cancer stem cell properties, their microenvironment,
and immune checkpoints to cover all possible kinds of
stemness (3).
Furthermore, this philosophical framework re-
cently has been applied to another field, the study of
organoids. In a systemic review of experimental data
on organoids from various sources, Picollet-D’hahan
et al. (4) characterized the ability to form organoids as
a dispositional property. They could then argue that
to increase the efficiency and reproducibility of
organoid production, a major current challenge in
the field, researchers need a better understanding of
the intrinsic part of the dispositional property that is
influenced by themicroenvironment. To discriminate the
intrinsic features of cells that have such a disposition, this
group is now developing high-throughput functional
genomic methods, enabling an investigation of the role
of virtually every human gene in organoid formation.
Immunogenicity and the Microbiome. Complemen-
tary to its role in conceptual clarification, philosophy can
contribute to the critique of scientific assumptions—and
can even be proactive in formulating novel, testable,
and predictive theories that help set new paths for
empirical research.
For example, a philosophical critique of the im-
mune self–nonself framework (5) has led to two sig-
nificant scientific contributions. First, it was the basis of
the formulation of a novel theoretical framework, the
discontinuity theory of immunity, which complements
previous self–nonself and danger models by pro-
posing that the immune system responds to sudden
modifications of antigenic motifs (6). This theory sheds
light on many important immunological phenomena,
including autoimmune disease, immune responses to
tumors, and immunological tolerance to chronically
expressed ligands. The discontinuity theory has been
applied to a multitude of questions, helping explore
the effects of chemotherapeutic agents on immuno-
modulation in cancer and spelling out how natural
killer cells constantly modify their phenotype and
functions through their interactions with their ligands
in a way that ensures tolerance to bodily (self) constitu-
ents (7). The theory also helps explain the consequences
of repeated vaccinations in immunocompromised indi-
viduals (8) and suggests dynamic mathematical models
of immune activation. Collectively, these various empir-
ical assessments illustrate how philosophically inspired
proposals can lead to novel experiments, opening up
new avenues for research.
Second, the philosophical critique contributed
along with other philosophical approaches to the no-
tion that every organism, far from being a genetically
homogenous self, is a symbiotic community harboring
and tolerating multiple foreign elements (including
bacteria and viruses), which are recognized but not
eliminated by its immune system (9). Research on sym-
biotic integration and immune tolerance has far-reaching
consequences for our conception of what constitutes
an individual organism, which is increasingly concep-
tualized as a complex ecosystem whose key functions,
from development to defense, repair, and cognition,
are affected by interactions with microbes (9).
Influencing Cognitive Science. The study of cognition
and cognitive neuroscience offers a striking illustration
of the deep and long-lasting influence of philosophy
on science. As with immunology, philosophers have
formulated influential theories and experiments,
helped initiate specific research programs, and con-
tributed to paradigm shifts. But the scale of the in-
fluence dwarfs the immunology case. Philosophy had
a part in the move from behaviorism to cognitivism
and computationalism in the 1960s. Perhaps most
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visible has been the theory of the modularity of mind,
proposed by philosopher Jerry Fodor (10). Its influ-
ence on theories of cognitive architecture can hardly
be overstated. In a tribute after Fodor’s passing in 2017,
leading cognitive psychologist James Russell spoke
in the magazine of the British Psychological Society
of “cognitive developmental psychology BF (before
Fodor) and AF (after Fodor)” (https://thepsychologist.
bps.org.uk/jerry-fodor-1935-2017).
Modularity refers to the idea that mental phe-
nomena arise from the operation of multiple distinct
processes, not from a single undifferentiated one.
Inspired by evidence in experimental psychology, by
Chomskian linguistics, and by new computational
theories in philosophy of mind, Fodor theorized that
human cognition is structured in a set of lower-level,
domain-specific, informationally encapsulated special-
izedmodules and a higher-level, domain-general central
system for abductive reasoning with information only
flowing upward vertically, not downward or horizontally
(i.e., between modules). He also formulated stringent
criteria for modularity. To this day, Fodor’s proposal sets
the terms for much empirical research and theory in
many areas of cognitive science and neuroscience (11,
12), including cognitive development, evolutionary
psychology, artificial intelligence, and cognitive an-
thropology. Although his theory has been revised
and challenged, researchers continue to use, tweak,
and debate his approach and basic conceptual toolkit.
The false-belief task constitutes another key in-
stance of philosophy’s impact on the cognitive sciences.
Philosopher Daniel Dennett was the first to conceive the
basic logic of this experiment as a revision of a test used
for evaluating theory of mind, the ability to attribute
mental states to oneself and others (13). The task tests
the capacity to attribute others with beliefs that one
considers false, the key idea being that reasoning about
others’ false beliefs, as opposed to true beliefs, requires
conceiving of other people as having mental represen-
tations that diverge from one’s own and from the way
the world actually is. Its first empirical application was in
1983 (14), in an article whose title, “Beliefs About Beliefs:
Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong
Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding of Deception,”
is in itself a direct tribute to Dennett’s contribution.
The false-belief task represents a milestone ex-
periment in various areas of cognitive science and
neuroscience, with wide application and implications.
They include testing for cognitive developmental
stages in children, debating the architecture of human
cognition and its distinct capacities, assessing theory of
mind abilities in great apes, developing theories of
autism as mind blindness (according to which diffi-
culties in passing the false-belief task are associated
with the condition), and determining which particular
brain regions are associated with the capacity to reason
about the contents of another person’s mind (15).
Philosophy has also helped the field of cognitive
science winnow problematic or outdated assump-
tions, helping drive scientific change. The concepts of
mind, intelligence, consciousness, and emotion are
used ubiquitously across different fields with often little
agreement on their meaning (16). Engineering artificial
intelligence, constructing psychological theories of
mental state variables, and using neuroscience tools to
investigate consciousness and emotion require the con-
ceptual tools for self-critique and cross-disciplinary di-
alogue—precisely the tools that philosophy can supply.
Philosophy and Scientific Knowledge. The above
examples are far from the only ones: in the life sciences,
philosophical reflection has played an important role in
issues as diverse as evolutionary altruism (17), debate
over units of selection (18), the construction of a “tree
of life” (19), the predominance of microbes in the bio-
sphere, the definition of the gene, and the critical ex-
amination of the concept of innateness (20). Likewise, in
physics, fundamental questions such as the defini-
tion of time have been enriched by the work of phi-
losophers. For example, the analysis of temporal
irreversibility by Huw Price (21) and closed temporal
curves by David Lewis (22) have helped dispel con-
ceptual confusion in physics (23).
Inspired by these examples and many others, we
see philosophy and science as located on a continuum.
Philosophy and science share the tools of logic, con-
ceptual analysis, and rigorous argumentation. Yet phi-
losophers can operate these tools with degrees of
thoroughness, freedom, and theoretical abstraction that
practicing researchers often cannot afford in their daily
activities. Philosophers with the relevant scientific knowl-
edge can then contribute significantly to the advance-
ment of science at all levels of the scientific enterprise
from theory to experiment as the above examples show.
But how in practice can we facilitate cooperation
between researchers and philosophers? At first
sight, the solution might seem obvious: each commu-
nity should make a step toward the other. Yet it would
be a mistake to consider this an easy task. The obsta-
cles are many. At present, a significant number of
philosophers disdain science or don’t see the relevance
of science to their work. Even among philosophers
who favor dialogue with researchers, few have a
good knowledge of the latest science. Conversely,
few researchers perceive the benefits philosophical
insights can bring. In the current scientific context,
dominated by increasing specialization and growing
demands for funding and output, only a very limited
number of researchers have the time and opportunity
to even be aware of the work produced by philosophers
on science let alone to read it.
Philosophy and science share the tools of logic,
conceptual analysis, and rigorous argumentation. Yet
philosophers can operate these tools with degrees of
thoroughness, freedom, and theoretical abstraction
that practicing researchers often cannot afford in their
daily activities.
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To overcome these difficulties, we believe that a se-
ries of simple recommendations, which could be readily
implemented, can help bridge the gap between science
and philosophy. The reconnection between philosophy
and science is both highly desirable and more realizable
in practice than suggested by the decades of estrange-
ment between them.
i) Make more room for philosophy in scientific con-
ferences. This is a very simple mechanism for
researchers to assess the potential usefulness of
philosophers’ insights for their own research. Re-
ciprocally, more researchers could participate in
philosophy conferences, expanding on the efforts
of organizations such as the International Society
for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Bi-
ology; the Philosophy of Science Association; and
the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice.
ii) Host philosophers in scientific labs and depart-
ments. This is a powerful way (already explored
by some of the authors and others) for philosophers
to learn science and provide more appropriate and
well-grounded analyses, and for researchers to
benefit from philosophical inputs and acclimatize
to philosophy more generally. This might be the
most efficient way to help philosophy have a rapid
and concrete impact on science.
iii) Co-supervise PhD students. The co-supervision of
PhD students by a researcher and a philosopher is
an excellent opportunity to make possible the cross-
feeding of the two fields. It facilitates the production
of dissertations that are both experimentally rich and
conceptually rigorous, and in the process, it trains
the next generation of philosopher-scientists.
iv) Create curricula balanced in science and philoso-
phy that foster a genuine dialogue between them.
Some such curricula already exist in some countries,
but expanding them should be a high priority. They
can provide students in science with a perspective
that better empowers them for the conceptual chal-
lenges of modern science and provide philosophers
with a solid basis for the scientific knowledge that
will maximize their impact on science. Science cur-
ricula might include a class in the history of science
and in the philosophy of science. Philosophy curric-
ula might include a science module.
v) Read science and philosophy. Reading science is
indispensable for the practice of philosophy of sci-
ence, but reading philosophy can also constitute a
great source of inspiration for researchers as illus-
trated by some of the examples above. For example,
journal clubs where both science and philosophy
contributions are discussed constitute an efficient
way to integrate philosophy and science.
vi) Open new sections devoted to philosophical
and conceptual issues in science journals. This
strategy would be an appropriate and compelling
way to suggest that the philosophical and concep-
tual work is continuous with the experimental work,
in so far as it is inspired by it, and can inspire it in
return. It would also make philosophical reflections
about a particular scientific domain much more
visible to the relevant scientific community than
when they are published in philosophy journals,
which are rarely read by scientists.
We hope that the practical steps set out above will
encourage a renaissance in the integration of science
and philosophy. Furthermore, we argue that maintain-
ing a close allegiance with philosophy will enhance the
vitality of science. Modern science without philosophy
will run up against a wall: the deluge of data within each
field will make interpretation more and more difficult,
neglect of breadth and history will further splinter and
separate scientific subdisciplines, and the emphasis on
methods and empirical results will drive shallower and
shallower training of students. As Carl Woese (24)
wrote: “a society that permits biology to become an
engineering discipline, that allows science to slip into
the role of changing the living world without trying
to understand it, is a danger to itself.” We need a
reinvigoration of science at all levels, one that returns
to us the benefits of close ties with philosophy.
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advance all levels of the scientific enterprise, from theory to experiment. Recent
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